

Political Appointment of the Executives to QUANGOs in Korea

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ABSTRACT: This paper identifies the determinants for political appointment of executives (CEOs, standing inspectors and executive directors) to QUANGOs (Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations) in Korea. In this paper, the political appointment of quango executives is viewed as the outcome of complex games that take place between public organizations, government departments and the President, not as top-down decision-making by one actor. The result of our empirical analysis support the idea that the political appointment of the executives is an outcome of interaction among three main actors who behave strategically and rationally behave with their own resources and incentives. Two moderating variables, types of quangos and legal changes influence the relationship among the actors and that lead to the change of the determinants for the political appointment of the executives to quangos in Korea.

KEYWORDS: public organizations, quangos, executives, political appointment, bureaucratic appointment, politicization, logistic regression.

The paper identifies the determinants for political appointment of executives (CEOs, standing inspectors, and executive directors) to QUANGOs (Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations) in Korea. Quangos refer to the hybrid organizations that are created by governments to operate 'at arm's length' under the guidance of appointees. However the list of associated acronyms for organizations which expend public money and fulfill a public function, but exist with some degree of independence from elected officials, includes many: NDPBs (Non Departmental Public Bodies), NGOs (Non Governmental Organizations), QAOs (Quasi-Autonomous Organizations), besides QUANGOs. Similar terms also include 'intermediate organization' or 'third sector'. While representing no firm, tangible or clear organizations, they provide a continuum on which a diverse range of bodies can be placed (Flinders and Smith, 1999).

In the past, traditional bureaucracies and hierarchical structures took the lead but as the idea of New Public Management proliferated since the 1980s, quangos have been increasing rapidly. We can make the best use of quangos to satisfy public needs as they are between public and private sectors but moral hazard and inefficiencies are assumed to exist at the same time (Loegreid and Roness 2003; Newland 1996; Nolan 2001). Moreover, quangos weaken the link between elector and government (Skelcher 1998; Cole 2000). Therefore, the issue of how to make quangos accountable and responsible to the public has always been a matter of concern for many of scholars in worldwide. To solve these problems, reform of quangos' corporate governance often has been discussed. Strengthening the political control through the appointment and dismissal of the executives is the key issue in the management of public organizations for the lack of an electoral process. Personnel management in quangos is not only the nomination by the decision makers but the issue of balancing between organizational autonomy (flexibility) and democratic control (accountability). Furthermore, it is directly linked to the social service quality to the public.

However, in Korea, there are strong resists to the idea of political appointment: Rather it has been the target of criticism, because it was regarded as the underlying cause of moral hazards and corruptions. So there have always been controversies over the appointment of the executives

regardless of regime changes over time. This is a prevailing social issue, although quangos have done a critical role in economic and social development. The controversies over political control by political appointment ("*Nakhasan*" in a very negative term) of the executives of public bodies have always been troublesome because of the authoritarian legacy and top-down decision making systems. "*Nakhasan*" is a kind of patronage system designating to the post without considerations of appropriateness, just like parachuting to the ground ("*Nakhasan*" means parachute in Korean). Although the reform effort taken since the Kim Young-Sam government was focused on reducing political appointment, public organizations have repeatedly committed moral hazards and lax management.

The core of all that criticism is that presidents have quangos under their thumbs but as shown in the <table 2>, it does not happen always. According to resource dependence theory, other organizations such as government departments or quangos have some resources. Quangos, hybrid organizations between the public and private sector, cannot be free of political control and are more susceptible to political situation. Because quangos can be viewed as a sector over which the government of the day uses its power of appointment in order to gain advantage, extend its influence and achieve responsive competence (Skelcher 1998). However, executives of quangos are not government officials. Their tenure of office is stipulated by law, thereby their appointments into office differ from how administrative officials are appointed. With this tenure system for executives, quangos can provide stable administrative services regardless of changes in the political environment. However, public organizations mix political pursuits, public interest, and entrepreneurship, so that they could not efficiently satisfy the expectations of democratic principles.

In this paper, we argue that the political appointment of quango executives is the outcome of complex games that take place between public organizations, the President and government departments, not the result of a top-down decision-making by one actor. The appointment to boards is a politically contested space as Skelcher (1998) points. These interactions depend on numerous factors, such as the resources and incentives of the quangos, presidents and ministries, as well as certain moderating factors, including the class of the executives, types of quangos and institutional changes. If it is possible to explain and expect who will be nominated in what position and what kind of organizations, we can make a reasonable approach to the governance problem out of political and ideological debates.

THEORETICAL CONTEXTS

Prior Research

In the historical context, the discussion about personnel management is about merit and spoils systems, which is also about trade-off between expertise (neutral competence) and democratic control (responsive competence). Since the late 1980's, there has been much interest and research on the need to reform in the public sector. However, interest in the appointment of the quango executives has been relatively insufficient and what little researches on this sector have been mostly descriptive researches presenting the social background of the executives. Prior research is classified as those on the social effects of such political appointments, those on the realities and causes that lead to political appointment of executives.

First, researches on social effects can emphasize negative aspects or positive aspects. Since politically appointed executives have always been deemed negative, most researches have focused on finding measures to prevent it. Lee Myeong-seok (2000) was the first to empirically prove that political appointments actually have negative effects. He conducted an investigation and analysis on the career and performance of director generals and presidents of 18 GSEs from 1985 to 1996. His study revealed that ex-politicians and ex-government executives performed poorly.

Many studies have been conducted on taking precautions against the negative effects brought about by political appointments (Pfiffner 1987, Cohen 1998, Light 1987 1999, Mackenzie 2001, Yoshimoto 2006, Lewis 2007 2008). Political appointees have been criticized to lack professionalism

and have narrow views. It was observed that many appointed officials were indifferent to policies and activities that promise long-term effects and, therefore, impairing the continuity of ongoing administrative initiatives (Cohen, 1998, Ingraham 1987). Particularly, it has been pointed out that political appointees for quasi-government sectors may, in fact, be against the original purpose of those particular organizations to provide administrative services efficiently regardless of the prevailing political atmosphere (Pfiffner 1987, Lewis 2007). Using a case study on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Lewis (2008) proved that there exist conflict relations of sacrificing business outcomes if the president wanted to exercise control and power. A quantitative research using the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) on the Bush administration (Lewis 2007) showed that career government officials, i.e. different experiences in government departments and the tenure of office, have statistically significant effects on business performance while for the political appointees, their high level of education and various experiences in diverse areas were found to have no effect on business performance. Moreover, studies proved that ideological homogeneity brought about by employing political appointees does not guarantee responsible capabilities (Pfiffner 1999, Ingraham 1987). Therefore, many scholars contend that the practice of political appointment should be reduced as much as possible in order to attain a neutral and responsible administration.

On the other hand, several other scholars emphasize the positive aspects of political appointees. One example of a positive aspect is that political appointees not only create appropriate tension between political control and job responsibilities inside and outside the organization (Durant 1991, Rourke, 1984), but also push forward with firm belief what the president considers important (Nathan 2000). Analysts assert that political appointees are evaluated based on their performance and many of such appointees have produced good business results. Analysts claim that the negative images of such appointees are generated, in many cases, from stereotyped perceptions (Maranto 2005). These people understand the president's initiatives very well and therefore exert much effort to actively pursue their fruition based on their experiences and political influence. These may bring about changes in policies and organizations. It can be said that the greatest advantage brought about by political appointees is that such appointees can inspire vitality into stagnant organizations. Another advantage is that they can intensively invest time and effort in carrying out what careerists could not do. Also, appointees can elicit cooperation between the public sector and the private sector. It is believed that the president tends to utilize political appointees as change agents when attempting to reform public organizations. In other words, the role of political appointees is to imbue the value of democracy into bureaucracy or public organizations. Although the principle of a merit system prevails these days, the tradition of a patronage system still remains at the top group management. Even in the U.K. and the U.S., there are separate bureaus that deal with the presidential appointments.

Unlike other countries where researches tend to deal with both the positive and negative aspects of political appointees, the majority of research materials in Korea and Japan focus on negative aspects alone. There are not much research on the realities and causes of how the executives in quangos are actually appointed. Studies on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the executives are in line with the discussions on representative democracy. However, Skelcher (1998) pointed out that it is difficult to research this area because relevant data are scarce. Since it is known in Korea that the president politically appoints all executives, there is little research done to theoretically explain the reasons and determinants of the political appointment. Several prior studies on the reasons for political appointments have been made by Japanese scholars. Such research materials focus on the persons and organizations who exercise appointment powers. According to Joh (1996), works in Japan conducted on the persons who exercise appointment powers emphasize the supply side and contend that typically political appointments take place as a result of rent-seeking by government officials. It is a viewpoint that regards it as a rational choice in order to solve the promotion congestion or salaries problems or to heighten and facilitate control and power over public organizations.

On the other hand, research emphasizing on organizations contend that political appointments take place because quangos try to enhance accessibility to the government and to reduce instability by employing persons who have resources such as quality information and informal network connections. Even in areas where public organizations do not actively attract political

appointees, there is a natural tendency to them in these areas where such appointees are more desirable. For example, it has been reported that political appointees bring about more desirable results in the areas of science and technology (Auer 2008). Therefore, we can hypothesize that political appointments may be different depending on the activities or policy types of the concerned public organizations.

Prior research on this matter observes the following: First, the personnel management of the executives of quangos is widely discussed as a negative practice in Korea (*Nakhasan*) and Japan (*amakudari*), while as a corporate governance to maximize organizational performance and minimize agency problems in England and USA. Second, even most of the studies that assume the appointments as a political phenomenon only focus on the negative aspects of such appointments. These studies discuss the remedies and there are considerably fewer research on how political appointments actually take place.

Third, since prior studies on the reasons for political appointments have viewed such appointments from a political point of view contending that persons with appointment powers could solve personnel management problems, there has been little room for taking the characteristics of public organizations into account. Since it has been viewed that the appointment of the board members is politically decided by the president or the department ministers, it has been, therefore, assumed that public organizations in which such appointments are made have no power in themselves and are in position merely to accept (demand) the appointed executives. In Korea and Japan, since those hoping the power of appointment unilaterally decide on the selection of its board members, much can be explained from such a top-down approach. But even upon recognizing this fact, prior studies reveal the limitations in taking the quangos as an aggregated entity as the object to be analyzed. In other words, they have assumed that quangos are regarded as a single organization and that all quangos have their executives by the same procedures. Also, prior research has not separately focused on the persons who exercise appointment powers. Since the president and government departments have different approaches in the appointment of the quango executives, it is necessary to explain how their intentions are coordinated and when and who has stronger influencing power in what condition. Furthermore, we should explain how the three parties are mutually related depending on the class of positions.

Theoretical Frameworks

This study examines how the board members of public organizations are appointed and the reasons thereof. In the past, the appointment in the public organizations was determined in competent ministries and departments. Presently, however, it can be said that such appointment is determined by the ‘tug-of-war’ among actors. In other words, the appointment of the executives of quangos is not a unilateral choice of actors with power of appointment but a result of the interaction between three concerned parties – public organizations, the president, and government departments. Based on this fact, this study attempts to examine the characteristics of the executives that vary depending on the class of their position. Accordingly, in order to analyze the factors, the characteristics of the public organizations, the president, and concerned government departments need to be taken into account. The major research hypothesis is that the appointment of the executives of quangos depends on the resources (powers) and interests (incentives) of the major actors – public organizations, the president, and government departments.

Prior research studies have treated quangos or public organizations as an aggregated entity, as they assumed quangos to be the passive actor in the appointment process. However, quangos are the most interested of all the parties and are made up of many kinds of organizations with different resources and different resource dependencies. Even the most dependent of these organizations will have some discretion and influence on the appointment process. Public organizations usually seek to reduce their dependency on other organizations and in so doing increase their autonomy and chances of survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, the quangos will often have different strategies for the appointment of board members. On one hand, they tend to depend on the President instead of

ministers, but on the other hand, they will often co-opt with an ex-bureaucrat as an executive so as to improve their relationship with government departments. Quangos can wield some influence on the appointment process by using their resources. Thus, the following hypothesis is offered:

H1: The appointment of quangos' executives is an outcome of the interactions of the three main actors, quangos, the President, and departments. The relationship among them depends upon their resources and incentives to intervene the appointment process.

We hypothesize that as the resource dependency of quangos lessens, the possibility for internal promotion of their executives is likely to rise, the organizational resources are abundant, as their organizational size and age is bigger and older, quangos are more likely to have internally promoted persons as their board members. If quangos become more willing to have their own people as board members, their interests and incentives depend on quangos' internal competition and unions for the organization. Although unions have various strategies to use to influence the appointment of CEOs and standing inspectors, they still try to represent the employees' voice and struggle for their own well-being. As the ratio of standing executives (an internal competition measure) and the ratio of union members of quangos become higher, their incentives to have their internal personnel as executives are more likely to be more intense.

For modern presidents, political appointment or "politicizing" has become a vital tool used to control both government and the public sector. Politicization involves "an increase in the number of PAS, SES, Schedule C, and similarly excepted agency-specific appointees" (Lewis 2008: 25). Personnel management is the most important source of control, so politically appointed jobs are crucial political resources for all presidents. The patronage system remains still very powerful in top-level appointments around the world and for special organizations like the Office of Presidential Personnel (OPP) that was set up in the White House. Because of the tension that can exist between securing democratic accountability and preserving the autonomy and flexibility of public organizations, the question of why, when, and where presidents politicize is getting increased scrutiny in the modern presidency system.

The most difficult problem regarding such politicization is that there can be considerable variations in the departments and also the public organizations. As recent studies show, quangos related to national defense have more Republicans while Democrats are more dominant in social service organizations (Maranto and Hult 2004). Thus, it is important to determine when Presidents actually do politicize more and what affects that decision in public organizations. Presidents do have statutory authority to appoint board members, but often the Presidents will make these decisions under pressure from others that affect their time-frame (the transition period and the lame-duck period, for example) and their political resources (the current percentage of the Presidential party that is seated in Congress).

Government departments also have official power to appoint and strong incentives to intervene in the personnel management of quango boards. The departments as the link to the multiple principal-agent relationship are assumed to be the rational interest maximizers that can ease internal promotion pressures and regulate their associated quangos through expertise. As Johnson (1974) indicates, bureaucracy has been considered to be a safety device for sustaining developing countries, such as Korea and Japan. Thus, the bureaucratic preference to appoint ex-bureaucrats to the quango boards is more easily reinforced. Government departments seek to maximize the possibilities of promotion and increase managerial power by using the quangos. Their interest in appointing ex-government officials as board members is measured by the average year to promotion and a degree of internal competition. Thus we offer the following hypothesis:

H2: The inter-relationship among the three main actors – the quangos, the presidents and the departments - is likely to vary across the class of positions. The presidential factors will be significant in the appointment of CEOs, while both Presidents and the departments will retain an influence on the appointment of standing inspectors. With regard to executive directors, both quangos and the departments will share influential power.

The CEO of a quango is the delegated person who has the decision-making power to guide the organization. Both the President and the departments are most interested in that class to achieve their goals. On one hand, quangos try to select a powerful person as their CEO to buffer political turnover. They would rather have a person who is linked to the President than the departments acting as a two-step leverage strategy (Gargiulo 1993). On the other hand, unions in public organizations have more complex strategies so as to place an internally promoted person who can be easily controlled or obtain a fringe benefit by approving an outside person. A standing inspector of a quango is responsible for monitoring the operation of the organization. However, that entity has been the target of criticism as the '*Nakhasan* (parachute personnel)' because many politicians and ex-bureaucrats tend to be seated in that position with all its strings for a long time. An executive director of a quango, as a member of the board, has the right to implement the public works of the organization. So it is often appointed as the most well-informed person on internal matters.

Other than the factors of the main parties, the type of quangos and legal institutional changes are considered as moderating variables. A moderating variable is characterized statistically as an interaction which can affect the direction and/or strength of the relation between dependent and independent variables (Wikipedia). Typology of quangos is very important to set up the guideline to manage and control quangos' corporate governance. There can be various criteria on the typology of quangos, such as the work characteristics, financial publicness (Chun and Rainey 2005), source of origins (Skelcher 1998) and legal status (Lewis 2007, 2008). Also, the legal changes are key factors that can bring about the changes of the resources and incentives of the concerned parties. Especially the changes of the legal right of appointment are directly linked to the resources of the actors.

H3: The inter-relationship among the three main actors is likely to vary across certain moderating variables, such as the type of quangos and legal changes.

DATA AND MEASURES

Dependent Variable

As one's major career is considered a very important factor in the appointment of the executives of quangos, the dependant variable, political appointment, is measured by the major carriers of the executives as a proxy variable. The major careers of the executives appointed between March 1993 and December 2007 (President Kim Yong-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun) can be classified into these main categories: bureaucrats, soldiers and politicians, private experts, promotions from internal organizations and the others. Also, in other prior research studies, one's background is used as a proxy variable to measure the intention of the person with appointment powers. Although it is difficult to judge the intention of the person with appointment powers, simplification through operational definition to grasp the overall trends and tendencies was inevitable as the factors related to the appointment of executives are diverse and hidden context varies depending on the case.

Notwithstanding the facts, there was a case in which it was difficult to judge one man's major career. For example, we can think of a case in which, although it is internal promotion from the view point of immediate previous career, one can have the experience of being in office as a bureaucrat, or of working for the Blue House or of a member of the Presidential Transition Committee. So, the analysis was conducted on both in terms of understanding the executives' career as an immediate previous career and the case of considering careers prior to the immediate previous career, and both cases had little effect on the results of the analysis. In this paper, the internal promotion in public organizations and ex-government officials, and all the remaining careers are bound together, so there were few cases in which it is difficult to determine the major career. So, the immediate previous

career was basically given first priority by applying these two criteria as mutual supplements and when the past careers were thought to have important effects, they were treated as the major career.

Independent and Moderating Variables

The independent variables are quango factors, the president and government departments. First, quangos tend to reduce their dependence on other actors or external environments. There are various types of resources, but here I consider financial resources and organizational size and age. Financial resources are measured by the financials and work dependence of the quangos. Organizational size is measured by total revenue and the number of full-time employees; organizational age is calculated by (the current year minus the year of establishment) plus one. If a quango was established in 1983, the age of the organization is 26 which are calculated by (2008-1983) +1. Quangos' internal competition is measured by a ratio of the standing executives and the union variables, whether there is a union or not; if there is a union, the ratio of the union members is considered.

Second, the presidents have the legal rights to appoint quango boards, especially CEOs, and have an interest in appointing their own political and ideological supporters to the boards. However, there are only but a few studies that directly focused on when presidents try to politicize different organizations and for what reasons. Here I focus on the motivation of such politicization by the presidents. The characteristics of the presidents are coded as dummy variables as follows: Kim Young-Sam=0, Kim Dae-Jung=1, Roh Moo-Hyun=2. The presidents are willing to politicize some quangos because the presidents have to concentrate on public commitment and political vision with limited resources. President Roh concentrated on real estate policy and welfare for the weak more than anything else, so it was expected to see more politicians appear in that field. The most important resource presidents have is time; much of those time resources are in the transition period, so it is coded as the first year of the terms, 1993, 1998, 2003=1, with others=0, as presidents have the least time in their lame-duck period. That period is coded as the last year of the terms, 1997, 2002, 2007=1, and others=0. Political support for the presidents is measured by the ratio of the number of seats of presidential party compared to all seats in Congress.

Government departments, which have the right of direction and control of their affiliated quangos, are presumed as a group of seemingly rational actors trying to maximize their own promotion and ease competition. There appear to be many ex-bureaucrats who have become executives of quangos, based on the close relationship between quangos and the sponsoring department. From the beginning, quangos were hived off the bureaucracy, so these appointment practices are somewhat inevitable for the transfer of information and expertise and to cut down transaction costs. Generally, it is believed that economic departments have more expertise to wield influence on quangos because of their knowledge resources. Departments are more likely to fulfill their goals by appointing ex-bureaucrats to be quango executives when the internal promotion pressures are severe and the internal competitions of high-level officials are high. This tendency is similar to the motivation of the *amakudari* in Japan. Internal promotion pressures are measured by the average years to be promoted for someone in Grade 6 to Grade 4. However, the average years to promotion was not gathered until 2007, so we have to use one-year data for the panel. Internal competition in government departments to be appointed as executives is calculated by the ratio of high-level officials to the number of associated quangos.

As moderating variables, which can influence the relationship among the three actors, we use type of quangos and legal changes. Quangos can be divided into various types, however, we considered only three types: source of origin, work characteristics, and the typology of the current law regulating quangos. Source of origin has been considered as the important factor in prior research (Lewis 2007, Lim 1994). If the quangos are established under the special law, they tend to have legal resources and a clear source of existence. Work characteristics of quangos are also considered so as to estimate the level of expertise. It is believed that quangos in charge of inspection, finance, promotion, and employing funds are required to have a higher level of expertise than others. Additionally, here are four types of quangos based on the current law, which are necessary to regulate and manage the

organizations. As the legal situation changes, we considered the appointment right based on the law of the Articles and the Recommendation Committee.

The right to appointment of executives is shared by the President and the Ministers of the departments. Four cases of appointment are considered: Appointment by the presidents with ministerial proposition, by ministers only, by the ministers with the agreement of the CEOs, and by the CEOs with the approval of the ministers. Meanwhile, the government introduced a "human resources pool system" in order to widen possible pool for CEO and the "CEO Recommendation Committee" to ensure selection of capable chief executive officers (CEOs). The Recommendation Committee, the first official attempt to reduce "Nakhasan" by an open and fair system of recruitment was introduced step by step to the CEOs of 18 GSEs (Government Sponsored Enterprises) in 1999 and extended to the CEOs of most of the Associated quangos in 2004. Now it is applied to all executives of public organizations beginning in 2007.

<Table 1> Variables and Measurement

	Variables	Measurement	Code	
Dependent variables	Major career of the executives (Multinomial logistic)	political appointment (soldiers, bureaucrats, politicians and experts) =0	Z2	
		bureaucratic appointment (ex-bureaucrats) =1		
		the internally promoted =2		
Independent variables: Quango factors	Fiscal dependence (%)	= (government funding/ total revenue) * 100	DEPEN	
	Work dependence(%)	= (work cost of quango i / net revenue) * 100	WORK	
	Organizational size	total revenue of quango i (million won)	REVE	
	Organizational age	the number of full-time employees of quango i	NUM	
	Organizational age	= (2007 – year of establishment) +1	AGE	
	Internal competition of quango	= (the number of executives / the number of full-time employees) * 100	BOARD	
	Unions	union = 1. None = 0 = (the number of union members / the number of full-time employees) * 100	UNION MUNIR	
Independent variables: President factors	Presidential turnover	Kim Young-Sam =0, Kim Dae-Jung =1, Roh Moo-Hyun=2	PRESID	
	Presidential vision and commitment	(Roh =1, others=0)×(Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Ministry of Health and Welfare= 1, others=0) (interaction term)	VISION	
	transition period (first year of the term)	1993, 1998, 2003 = 1, others =0	INITI	
	Lameduck (last year of the term)	1997, 2002, 2007 = 1, others =0	LAME	
	Congressional political support	= (the number of Congressman of presidential party / total number of Congressman) * 100	PPTY	
Independent variables: Department factors	Work characteristics	Economic departments =0, social departments =1	ECON	
	Promotion pressure of the departments,	Average year to promote grade 6 to grad 4 (2007 Civil Service Committee)	PRMT	
	Internal competition of departments	= (the number of high-level officials / the number of associated quangos) * 100	HIGH1	
Moderating variables	Type of quangos	The source of origins	Special law =1, delegated law =2, general civil law=3	SOURCE
		Work characteristics	Inspection, finance, promotion, employing funds =0, training, managing facilities, R&D support, natural resources, culture and life =1	TYPE2
		Type by the Law	Public enterprise (market-based) =0, public enterprise (quasi-market-based) =1, quasi-government organizations (fund managing) =2, quasi-government organizations (contract-out) =3	TYPE1
	Legal changes	Appointment right by the Law or the Articles	Appointment by the Presidents with the ministerial proposition =0, Appointment by the Ministers =1, Appointment by the Ministers with the agreement of the CEOs =2, Appointment by the CEOs with the approval of the Minister =3	RULE1
		The Recommendation Committee	The CEOs of GSE (18 quangos): before 1999 =0, after =1, The CEOs of associated quangos: before 2004 =0, after =1, All executives of public organizations: before 2007 =0, after =1	RECM

METHOD

As the dependent variable is the major career of the quango executives, it is not continuous variables but qualitative and discrete. In order to look at the process of political appointment and identify the impact factors involved in that process, the logistic regression model with the discrete dependent variable is adopted.

Logistic regression is the most actively used statistical technique especially when the dependent variable is qualitative. This is also called discrete choice model in the sense that this variable is not of a continuous type. If the dependent variable is qualitative, the hypothesis of normality and homoscedasticity collapse, the degree of significance of the t-value cannot be accurately judged (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000), and bias can occur as inferring standard deviation. So the independent variable that is significant in the linear regression analysis can appear insignificant in the logistic regression analysis. The core of the logistic regression analysis is to infer the logarithmic value of the odds. The odds, which can also be called chances of success, represents how much greater the probability of an event happening is than the probability of it not happening.

The case in which dependent variables have more than three categories is called multinomial logistic regression. Multinomial logistic, which is to conduct binary logistic several times, first determines the reference category and conducts binomial logistic regression analysis by making each pair with the remaining categories. When the dependent variables are composed of many categories, it minimizes the deviation of inference to make the group that has the most cases as the base category. For the multinomial logistic model to distinguish the presidential political appointments from bureaucratic appointments, the dependent variable has three categories, internal promotion, bureaucrats, politicians and others. If one executive's major career is that of a politician, a soldier, or a private expert, the possibility of political appointment by the presidents will increase. I constructed an unbalanced panel dataset that included 85 public organizations in the public organization portal (www.alio.go.kr) and the White Papers of each government.

As the models used in this study use the panel data with time series and cross-section data, the logistic regression equations can be represented as follows.

$$\log\left(\frac{P}{1-P}\right) = a + \sum_{i=1}^{85} \sum_{n=1}^8 X_{1nit} + \sum_{i=1}^{85} \sum_{n=1}^5 X_{2nit} + \sum_{i=1}^{85} \sum_{n=1}^3 X_{3nit} + \sum_{i=1}^{85} \sum_{n=1}^5 X_{4nit}$$

X= variables, i= quangos 1, 2, ..., 85, t= year 1, 2, ..., 15, a= intercept

X_{1nit} : Independent Variables (resources and incentives of quangos), n= 1, 2, ..., 8

X_{2nit} : Independent Variables (resources and incentives of presidents), n= 1, 2, ..., 5

X_{3nit} : Independent Variables (resources and incentives of departments), n= 1, 2, 3

X_{4nit} : Moderating Variables (law and institutional changes), n= 1, 2, ..., 5

RESULTS

The results of examining the distribution of major careers of the executives appointed during the terms of presidents Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Roh Moo-Hyun, who are in the category of analysis, showed that, on the whole, the number of the executives who had been bureaucrats, soldiers, or politicians was found to be decreased, whereas the number of executives who had been private experts, internally promoted persons and others was found to be increased.

In particular, it could be confirmed that ex-bureaucrats accounted for 41.6% of all executives during President Kim Young-Sam's era, 35.2% during President Kim Dae-Jung's era, and 29.4% during President Roh Moo-Hyun's era, showing continued decreases in number. Before President Kim Young-Sam was in power, the executives of public organizations were predominantly ex-bureaucrats, ex-military men, ex-politicians, and thus private experts were perceived not to be targets of 'political consideration'. However, when President Roh Moo-Hyun was in power, persons who were close to the president, including lawyers and members of NGOs, were classified as private experts and these people were frequently appointed as the executives of public organizations. President Roh Moo-Hyun was relatively less indebted to politicians than his predecessors, and was close to outsiders classified as private experts. The increase in internal promotion can be said to be a noticeable change when the Roh Moo-Hyun government came to power.

The CEOs of quangos, who were ex-bureaucrats in the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Roh Moo-Hyun governments, accounted for 71.8%, 51.7%, and 52.3%, respectively, showing similar percentages in Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun government eras with the exception of the Kim Young-Sam government. Moreover, ex-politicians in the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Roh Moo-Hyun governments accounted for 14.5%, 16.3%, and 8.4%, respectively, showing a sharp decrease in the Roh Moo-Hyun government era. However, CEOs who had been private experts accounted for 7.7%, 17.4%, and 25.2%, respectively, showing a sharp increase in the Roh Moo-Hyun government era. This is due to the fact that in the Roh Moo-Hyun government era, there were more CEOs who had been private experts than politicians among those who were close to the president.

As for standing inspectors, there were less and less inspectors who had been bureaucrats in more recent governments, but inspectors who had been politicians remained at an almost constant percentage throughout the eras of those three governments. Standing inspectors are in charge of internal monitoring of the operation of quangos, and due to their job responsibilities, the percentages of appointing new inspectors through internal promotion are very low.

The appointment of bureaucrats into the position of executive directors showed a clearly decreasing trend with 30.3% in the Kim Young-Sam government, 27.6% in the Kim Dae-Jung government, and 20.3% in the Roh Moo-Hyun government, whereas the ratio of internal promotion was increased in more recent governments, 54.4%, 57.4% and 65.2%, respectively.

<Table 2> Distribution of the Major Career of the executives

residents/ Class of Executives			Major Career						Total
			Bureaucrats	Soldiers	Politicians	Private Experts	Internal Promotion	Etc.	
President Kim Young-Sam	CEOs	The number of persons	84	3	17	9	3	1	117
		Within class (%)	71.8%	2.6%	14.5%	7.7%	2.6%	.9%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	36.7%	12.0%	29.8%	20.0%	1.6%	10.0%	21.3%
	Standing Inspectors	The number of persons	48	16	26	12	7	4	113
		Within class (%)	42.5%	14.2%	23.0%	10.6%	6.2%	3.5%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	21.0%	64.0%	45.6%	26.7%	3.8%	40.0%	20.5%
	Executive Directors	The number of persons	97	6	14	24	174	5	320
		Within class (%)	30.3%	1.9%	4.4%	7.5%	54.4%	1.6%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	42.4%	24.0%	24.6%	53.3%	94.6%	50.0%	58.2%
	Sub-total	The number of persons	229	25	57	45	184	10	550
		Within class (%)	41.6%	4.5%	10.4%	8.2%	33.5%	1.8%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
President Kim Dae-Jung	CEOs	The number of persons	89	14	28	30	7	4	172
		Within class (%)	51.7%	8.1%	16.3%	17.4%	4.1%	2.3%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	38.4%	66.7%	38.9%	34.9%	3.0%	22.2%	26.1%
	Standing Inspectors	The number of persons	40	5	33	18	9	9	114
		Within class (%)	35.1%	4.4%	28.9%	15.8%	7.9%	7.9%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	17.2%	23.8%	45.8%	20.9%	3.9%	50.0%	17.3%
	Executive Directors	The number of persons	103	2	11	38	214	5	373
		Within class (%)	27.6%	.5%	2.9%	10.2%	57.4%	1.3%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	44.4%	9.5%	15.3%	44.2%	93.0%	27.8%	56.6%
	Sub-total	The number of persons	232	21	72	86	230	18	659
		Within class (%)	35.2%	3.2%	10.9%	13.1%	34.9%	2.7%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
President Roh Moo-Hyun	CEOs	The number of persons	81	3	13	39	9	10	155
		Within class (%)	52.3%	1.9%	8.4%	25.2%	5.8%	6.5%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	39.7%	50.0%	22.4%	42.9%	3.1%	23.3%	22.4%
	Standing Inspectors	The number of persons	37	2	29	19	6	22	115
		Within class (%)	32.2%	1.7%	25.2%	16.5%	5.2%	19.1%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	18.1%	33.3%	50.0%	20.9%	2.1%	51.2%	16.6%
	Executive Directors	The number of persons	86	1	16	33	276	11	423
		Within class (%)	20.3%	.2%	3.8%	7.8%	65.2%	2.6%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	42.2%	16.7%	27.6%	36.3%	94.8%	25.6%	61.0%
	Sub-total	The number of persons	204	6	58	91	291	43	693
		Within class (%)	29.4%	.9%	8.4%	13.1%	42.0%	6.2%	100.0%
		Within career (%)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

We argue that the appointment of quango boards is the outcome of the interactions among three main actors who have different strategies and resources. Using multinomial logistic modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from 85 quangos in Korea.

The CEOs is the class of position in which the presidents (the Blue House) have the greatest interest and actively intervene. This position is one of a major class of positions that the presidents have tried to politicize so that public organizations can provide public services in line with their own vision and national administration policy directions and secure the reform of public organizations. Furthermore, public organizations tend to seek the help of powerful political figures in resisting influences from parties outside of the organization. The position of the CEO of a public organization is one in which competent ministries and departments that manage public organizations try to actively intervene in order to reduce the cost of supervising their agent organizations and enhancing managerial efficiency, and expediting the personnel promotion within the ministries and departments. However, as it is not possible to appoint persons in every class of position that competent ministries and departments want to appoint, competent ministries and departments appear to exert a great influence on public organizations whose works requires special knowledge, such as economics and finance.

Lewis (2003) asserted that the president's influence is gradually limited in relation to bureaucracy and that the president can exert influence within the scope of appointing the CEOs. Accordingly, when appointing the CEOs, not only the president who has appointment powers but also the government ministries appear to become important variables. This means that there can be conflicts between the president's strategic appointment and the government ministries and departments' bureaucratic appointment, depending on the characteristics of competent ministries. For example, the repeated public recruitment is the publicized conflicts between the president who intends to strategically appoint their people with special expertise and government ministries and departments that try to appoint an ex-bureaucrat as the CEO of quangos.

The presidents use their appointment powers not only to reinforce political powers by consolidating supporters by appointing those who meet their vision and to control the administrative power in leading the nation, but also to actualize their own vision and policies. Particularly as the Roh Moo-Hyun government set in, the Personnel Recommendation Meeting, in which the chief presidential secretary and senior secretaries participated, was officially operated and the president's influence in appointing the executives of quangos was officially established. So, the form and method of political appointment differ depending on the incumbent president and there are statistically significant differences in the distribution of the executives' major careers in terms of the class of position. However, the presidents make efforts to secure political resources based on legal resources, which gives the president the right to appoint the CEOs but does not appear to include the right to appoint the persons he wants as freely as possible in relation to government ministries and departments.

The presidents and also the department factors have significant effects on the appointment of CEOs. There is a greater probability that politicians will be selected than ex-bureaucrats when the internal competition in the department is not severe, the average year to promotion is longer, and Congressional support for the President is higher. Also, quangos under the department that take charge of social work are more likely to be seated with politicians than with bureaucrats. Although presidents have great incentives to politicization because of legal rights, presidents are not the single decision-maker in the appointment process of CEOs.

The standing inspectors, the second highest position within the organization, monitor internal management of the organization. However, the standing inspectors have been regarded as a post with little responsibilities compared with its authority and remuneration and are the target of controversies over the issue of 'parachute personnel'. However, due to the characteristics of the auditing business, it is more desirable to appoint an external person rather than an internal person as a standing inspector. The presidents (Blue House) and competent ministries intervene in the process of the appointment of standing inspectors, and it can be seen that persons who understand the president's (the incumbent government's) vision and satisfy diverse conditions are the ones qualified for the position. It was also found that when the public organization has considerable financial resources (total revenue), a highly

influential union, and in which it is easy for one to get a promotion, ex-bureaucrats, rather than ex-military men, ex-politicians, and private experts, are more likely to be appointed as standing inspectors. Particular, ex-bureaucrats are likely to be appointed as standing inspectors at the end of a presidential term. This indicates that the appointment of the standing inspectors is the object of the president's strategic appointment, and at the same time, is influenced by the government ministries and other concerned public organizations.

Therefore, the determinants for the appointment of standing inspectors seem to be more complex and dynamic; three main actors have some influence on this process. The higher probability to have bureaucrats rather than politicians as the standing inspectors is higher when quangos' total revenue is large, quangos have a union, the ratio of union members is high, the President's time resources are little (when presidents are lame ducks), and the average years to promotion are short. In the last year of a presidential term, the likelihood of nominating a person who they want is low, and thus bureaucrats are more likely to be appointed.

As an executive director is a member of the board of directors and has the authority to execute the business of public organizations, only those who are well acquainted with the internal affairs of public organizations are appointed in that position in many cases. As for the appointment of executive directors, both public organizations and government department factors are significant. Competent ministries and departments appoint executive directors in consultation with quangos or with unions exerting influence, leaving the Blue House to be seldom involved in the process. Executive directors are likely to be promoted internally due to the characteristics of the class of position and the president's relatively low interest. On the other hand, ex-bureaucrats, rather than internally promoted persons, were found to be appointed as executive director in the case of a small, relatively recently created organization with a small ratio of standing executives and where department's internal competition is severe. Unions in quangos try to appoint a person who has been working in that organization. The ability to have their own people is dependent on such resources as organizational size and age and the internal competition of the quangos. Many executive directors are promoted in the quangos, but the probability for appointment of ex-bureaucrats is higher when the average years to promotion are short and internal competition in the department is greater.

Based on these findings, it can be said that the greater the interest of the government departments is, the higher the probability of ex-bureaucrats being appointed as executive director. In other words, whether internally promoted persons or ex-bureaucrats are appointed as executive directors is determined by the size of resources and interests of the concerned public organizations and competent ministries. So with regard to the appointment of executive directors, resource dependence theories appear to be the most plausible explanation.

<Table 3> Multinomial Logistic Regression

Class of position		CEOs		Standing Inspectors		Standing Executives	
		base= bureaucrats		base= politicians		base= internal promotion	
Model		politicians	internal promotion	bureaucrats	internal promotion	politicians	Bureaucrats
Quango Factors	financial dependence	.003 (.0047)	.016 (.0111)	-.005 (.0052)	-.063 (.0917)	.004 (.0043)	.005 (.0040)
	work dependence	<.000 (<.0000)	-.000 (.0002)	.000 (.0000)	-.000 (.0005)	.000 (.0000)	.000 (.0000)
	total revenue	<.000 (<.0000)	<.000 (<.0000)	<.000* (<.0000)	<.000 (<.0000)	<.000 (<.0000)	<.000 (<.0000)
	full-time employees	.000 (.0000)	.000* (.0001)	-.000 (.0000)	-.001 (.0025)	-.000*** (.0001)	-.000* (.0001)
	organizational age	.008 (.0171)	-.027 (.0353)	.012 (.0188)	-.185 (.1763)	-.062*** (.0145)	-.049*** (.0127)
	ratio of standing executive	-.122 (.1201)	.493* (.2964)	.174 (.1228)	.478 (.5286)	.073 (.1186)	-.444*** (.1148)
	Unions	.010 (.5175)	1.433 (1.3300)	1.292** (.6156)	11.801* (7.1560)	.151 (.5362)	-.355 (.4624)
	ratio of union members	-.006 (.0053)	-.008 (.0128)	.011** (.0055)	.041 (.0354)	.002 (.0031)	.000 (.0030)
President Factors	presidential turnover	-.155*	-.161	.403	1.132	.146	-.221

		(.0890)	(.6107)	(.3145)	(1.6489)	(.2605)	(.2469)	
	presidential vision	.472 (.6384)	.802 ($<.0000$)	-2.825** (1.1802)	-29.796 ($<.0000$)	-.067 (.5724)	-.205 (.4832)	
	transition period (first year)	.296 (.4492)	-.218 (1.2010)	-.087 (.5505)	.323 (1.5845)	-.007 (.4097)	-.121 (.3619)	
	Lameduck (last year)	-.028 (.4642)	-.978 (1.0360)	1.033** (.4755)	1.599 (1.2905)	.807 (.4735)	-.160 (.3932)	
	ratio of presidential party	.056*** (.0207)	.005 (.0069)	.020 (.0220)	-.103 (.0845)	.092*** (.0301)	-.004 (.0199)	
Department Factors	work characteristics (social)	1.803*** (.4468)	-37.192 ($<.0000$)	.178 (.4371)	-4.418* (2.3556)	.824** (.3769)	.309 (.3407)	
	average year to promotion	.103* (.0622)	.383* (.2231)	-.179** (.0705)	.178 (.3745)	-.019 (.0807)	-.151** (.0663)	
	ratio of high-level officials	-.015*** (.0039)	-.023** (.0103)	-.004 (.0044)	-.030 (.0230)	-.005* (.0035)	.007** (.0032)	
Moderating Variables	Type of Quangos	source of origins	-.700** (.2900)	-.773 (.9385)	.635* (.3524)	1.003 (1.7699)	.377* (.2285)	.319 (.2110)
		work characteristics	.104 (.0702)	.406** (.1626)	-.016 (.0687)	-1.508* (.8619)	-.169** (.0674)	-.107** (.0584)
		type by the Law	.143 (.2069)	.358 (.4539)	.142 (.2058)	-.852 (1.2248)	-.181 (.1701)	.042 (.1564)
	Legal Changes	Recommendation Committee	-.110 (.5247)	-.287 (1.0245)	-.360 (.8429)	-40.527 ($<.0000$)	-.308 (.6709)	.213 (.5772)
		Legal rights to appoint	-1.347** (.5366)	-1.996* (1.1773)	-.225 (.1937)	-2.683* (1.6098)	-2.800* (1.6284)	3.166** (1.2685)
Model specificity	n of obs	287		229		732		
	LR Chi2	278.07		220.89		680.76		
	Prob > Chi2	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		
	Pseudo R2	0.4410		0.4390		0.4233		
	log likelihood	-176.26916		-141.13813		-463.80172		

note 1) *: $p < 0.1$, **: $p < 0.05$, ***: $p < 0.01$

note 2) coefficients (standard error)

note 3) (dropped) : the variable is automatically dropped because of the collinearity.

The findings from this study can be summarized precisely: First, regressions analyzing the determinants suggest that how executives are appointed in public organizations depends on the interactions between the quangos, presidents and government departments, and not on one single actor's choice or decision. The relationship between these three actors affects the appointment to the executives of public organizations and depends on their resources (power) and incentives (strategies). This finding challenges prior assumptions about presidents. They are not the only decision-makers in the political appointment process; they also have decisive power to appoint CEOs. However, quangos and departments also have some influence. The incentives of bureaucrats to promote and ease internal competition are very powerful and the opposition of unions in the quangos seems especially to be a political burden for presidents.

Secondly, the impact factors on the appointment of executives differ considerably based on the class of the executives. Presidents and ministries have formally shared the power to nominate their people for CEOs; however, quiet games are going on between the ministries and the quangos in the class of executive directors. As for the executive directors, presidential interest is relatively low and a type of nomination practice between quangos and ministries may form. Yet when the resources of public organizations are relatively munificent, the possibility of nominating those internally promoted as executive director is higher than for ex-bureaucrats. The political appointment of standing inspectors is often criticized as being the peak of "*Nakhasan*" of "spoils", and more complex interactions are witnessed. Ex-bureaucrats have a greater possibility to be appointed to the posts as the time resource factors for the president decrease. Strategic appointment by the president thus is based on variables such as vision of the president and the amount of time resources. The average year to promotion in the department was also significant factors in making bureaucratic appointments. In addition, total revenue of quangos as well as union-related variables also can have significant effect on the appointment of standing inspectors.

Thirdly, the relationship of the three actors affecting appointment of the executives of public organizations depends on the types of quangos. Although the term 'quango' is widely used, it is difficult to properly define due to the various types of organizations on the continuum. The typology

thus is the basis of the governance problem of autonomy and accountability that is to manage and control quangos. The result of the logistic regression for the study shows that the presidential factors of appointment are salient when sizable public organizations have clear source of origin. This finding illustrates that quangos are not aggregated entities but rather different organizations with different resource dependencies and relationships with other actors. So it is likely to be misleading when someone adheres to either a top-down approach to explain the appointment process.

Finally, the relationship of the three main actors depends on legal and institutional changes. The legal rights to appoint executives are very important factors. When ministers appoint CEOs, the ratio of ex-bureaucrats nearly doubles in comparison to the instances of presidential appointments. Meanwhile, the Recommendation Committee, adopted in 1999 and 2004 to make the appointment process transparent and reduce "Nakhasan" has not proved to be a significant factor in the actual appointment of the executives. However, changes in the relevant factors have been detected as being responsible for periods of institutional changes. Before the introduction of the Recommendation Committee, ministries have had the decisive power to appoint board members of the affiliated quangos, but those determinants became more dynamic and complex after institutional changes occurred in the rules of the game.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

It is often said that 'personnel management is everything.' Although this phrase is a cliché, the importance of personnel management, either in small organizations or one that covers the whole nation, cannot be emphasized enough. All the more so is personnel management in an organization that plays the role of providing the people with public services. As it is the people that actualize public interest and ideology, which is like a long-standing question, issues of personnel administration in the public administration have been ceaselessly emerging in slightly evolving form.

The appointment of the executives is not just an exercise of appointment powers by persons with legal authority but an essential part of governance to secure the efficient operation and responsibilities of public organizations. It is also directly connected with the president's overall national vision of the administration and management and with the quality of public services provided for the people. Accordingly, the appointment of quango executives needs to be discussed on a case-by-case basis as to what kind of persons are suitable to what class of position in what public organizations.

This research attempted to analyze and explain the factors determining who were appointed to what public organizations based on executives appointed to 85 national public organizations for 15 years from 1993 to 2007. Political factors such as official and unofficial authority (resources) that important actors around quangos have and their strategies and interests are bound to be involved in the appointment of executives. In this process, if we can explain what variables have more important effects on the appointment, more mature discussions free from controversies over consumptive 'parachute personnel' are considered possible.

One contribution of this research is the proposition of a preliminary model to guide future research on the appointment of the executives of quangos. Such an appointment is determined by the capacities and incentives of the three actors - the quangos, the presidents and the government departments - and the interactions among these actors will vary across the classes of positions, types of quangos and ongoing institutional changes. The appointment of the executives to quangos is, however, an outcome of the strategic relationship between three actors in a specific context.

Studies on the appointment of quango executives from the theoretical point of view have been very rare, and most of them have focused on technical analysis and description, so the framework of a consistent theoretical analysis is hardly found. So, the method of deriving variables from diverse theories such as resources dependence theory, politicization theory, and rational bureaucracy theory was adopted. Theoretical significance can be found in this research in that, as the object to be explained is clear, the objects that need to be explained in the appointment of the

executives were identified by finding the interesting relations between the variables that exert influence on the explanation.

However, there are limitations as well in this research. First, although the appointment of the executives was thought to be determined by the resources and interests of the three concerned parties, there were limitations in deriving and analyzing variables that reflect each party's resources and interests. The size of powers was regarded as the size of resources, but the resources that the three organizations equally secure were not able to be considered as variables.

Second, although it was assumed that the appointment of the executives can be affected by political circumstances surrounding the president, political actors surrounding the president such as political parties and the Blue House were not clearly taken into account. Moreover, the rational bureaucracy theory, which argues that the government ministries and departments actively utilize public organizations as the place that guarantees promotion, is the theory that explains 'amakudari' in Japan, and therefore, the 'Nakhasan' in Korea can be thought to have high explanatory power in view of the fact that competent ministries' average years required for promotion, etc. were also found to be statistically significant in this research. However, it can be a narrow hypothesis in the sense that bureaucrats functioning as serial loyalists of elected officials under the career civil service system and the presidential system are assumed to be rational profit seekers.

Finally, what is pointed out in the methodology is, above all, concerns the operational definition of the dependent variable. It is because this paper attempted to explain proxy variables, assuming the executives' major career reflect the intention of the person with appointive powers. Also, even if this research attempted to utilize panel data, we were not able to obtain all the year-based data for some variables. For example, average years required for promotion in ministries and offices and the number of union members of each public institution were not available, leaving the researchers to use the 2007 data for analysis. Despite these limitations, this study has made a substantial step forward understanding the political appointment process in the public organizations. This study has also made practical contributions to personnel management and governance reform of public organizations.

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