

# **The Centralization-Decentralization Paradox in Civil Service Reform: Why Training of a Centralized Civil Service May Lead to More Effective Democratization**

**Charles Wise**

John Glenn School of Public Affairs  
The Ohio State University

**Eva Witesman**

School of Public and Environmental Affairs  
Indiana University, Bloomington

## **Abstract**

*This paper describes an apparent paradox in civil service reform associated with democratization: While the end goal of such reform is decentralized government with local services and a professionalized civil service, reform itself is best supported by a centralized environment to achieve the democratic value and skills training needed to support transition to democracy. We discuss two models of reform, one in which structural decentralization precedes institutional democratization, and one in which the order of these reforms is reversed. We hypothesize that the structural characteristics (i.e. centralization vs. decentralization) of government affect the availability of training in values and skills fundamental to democratization. We test our hypothesis in statistical models predicting anticorruption training and policy skills training, using a model of technical skills training as a control. We find that having a centralized government structure significantly increases the odds of receiving both anticorruption training and policy skills training. We find no statistical correlation between central government structure and availability of technical skills training.*

## **Introduction**

Nation-states around the world have been facing increasing pressure from international organizations and foreign forces to move toward democratization (Brinkerhoff, 1999). The goal of EU accession in particular has been a key driving force for shaping the patterns of reform for neighboring former-Soviet states (Nunberg, 2000; Connaughton and Verheijen, 1999), though other pressures to engage in democratic reform also exist (Corkery, et. al., 1998). The coercive and normative pressures for structural and institutional change toward this particular governmental form (Frederickson, 2003) have been less than subtle. While some have faced overt diplomatic or even military pressures to democratize, many nations have chosen democratic models based on pressure from within. Overall, reforming nations have clear incentives to democratize in order to enhance governmental legitimacy in a world environment that increasingly favors democracy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

Two components of democratic reform have been of particular interest to the EU and other international proponents of democratization: Structural decentralization and institutional democratization. Structural decentralization refers to a devolution in the organization and relationship of government units in relation to one another, including the operation of decentralized, sovereign, self-

governing units (Rainey, 1997). Decentralization involves a shift of production and provision functions to more localized governmental units and also the incorporation of elections, oversight and accountability mechanisms and public input. Democratic structures thrive under conditions of transparency, equity, responsiveness, and accountability. Values associated with previous regimes or institutional arrangements do not always support structural democracy, and effort must be made to actively retrain civil servants to understand the new values associated with democratization. Institutional democratization refers to this shift in values, rules, skills and interactions, favoring transparency, equity, and other traditional democratic values (McGill, 1997; Hodgson, 2006, OECD, 1996)

The predominant approach to assistance in democratic reform has encouraged structural decentralization of government and devolution of power first, supported by subsequent efforts at training in the institutional skills and values necessary to sustain decentralized, self-governing government units (OECD, 1997). While a primarily structural model has been the prevalent approach, some have called for a more nuanced approach, considering decentralization and democratization separately (Rice, 1992; Polidano, 2001; Tonnisson and Paabus, 2004).

While the practice and rhetoric of democratic reform has recognized no conflict between structural decentralization and institutional democratization, simultaneous implementation of the two actually presents a significant paradox (Hood and Peters, 2004; Long and Franklin, 2004; Simon 1946). The operating assumption of democratic reform has been that if structural decentralization and institutional democratization are distinguishable, issues of institutional democratization are subsidiary concerns, intended only for the support of the greater structural decentralization effort. Herein lies the paradox. Top-down government reform efforts often operate with the aim of identifying, targeting and repairing deficiencies in bureaucratic function and typically assume a highly centralized model (Kolishchenko, 2005; Lucking, 2003). Some research suggests that centralization provides significant benefits to various aspects of public sector training and development (Cogburn, 2005). Therefore, it is possible that decentralization of government structures prior to shifts in institutional reform may actually limit government's capacity to achieve institutional democratization effectively, if at all. This clash of structural interests—democratic structural reform requiring decentralization and democratic institutional reform requiring centralization—may be the underlying saboteur of democratization efforts in various reforming nations.

We posit that the primary and overriding focus on structural decentralization in reforming nations threatens their capacity to achieve institutional democratization because a centralized training access point no longer exists for decentralized government structures.

Reform efforts in post-Soviet nations has been of particular interest to scholars since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Newland, 1996; Rice, 1992; Hale, 2005; to name a few). The transition from highly centralized governmental forms to more democratic forms has been less smooth for some nations than might have been hoped (Coston, 1998; Newland, 1996). Some nations, after experimenting with decentralized forms of government, have begun to recentralize in hopes of creating more stable government (Fish, 1994; Roeder, 1994).

One of the primary aims of civil service reform in the post-Soviet context is a change from previously existing institutions to arrangements more responsive to citizens and adherence to the rule of law. In addition, democratization envisions that public servants will not merely serve as passive implementers of their superiors' orders, but will serve to involve citizens in policymaking, and provide expert policy analysis to citizens and policymakers alike. The institutions governing the flow of power and resources in the Soviet system included prevalent systems of patronage and corruption; therefore, any civil service training or reform system in post-soviet nations must enhance not only efficiency and technical capacity but also legitimacy, transparency, and equity. Also vital to the reform in the post-Soviet context is the policymaking capacity of government officials who may be newly responsible for independent, autonomous decision making (Rice, 1992).

Ukraine is a democratizing former-Soviet nation that is in the midst of transition from a centralized structure to a decentralized structure. Ukraine, like other post-soviet nations inherited a bureaucratic structure that is highly centralized and is characterized by a top-down management system. Concomitantly, the public management imperative for public servants was unquestioning execution of their superiors' task orders no matter how corrupt, ill-conceived, or unresponsive to citizens such orders were. Further, no analysis of policy options were prepared or presented to political superiors or to citizens. Technocratic execution was the sole mandate. Since independence, remnants of the former soviet regime's top-down bureaucratic style has largely dominated at the central government level in Ukraine and in a sizable proportion of regional and local governments, especially in the eastern and southern portions of the country. However, with the coming of the "orange revolution" (Aslund and McFaul, 2006; Christensen, Rakhimkulov, and Wise, 2005), and the installation of the Yushchenko presidency, a new central presence in the Presidential Administration has pressed for democratic reform of the bureaucracy. Also, though the specific structural arrangements are still in a state of flux, local governments with a degree of autonomy were established I the early years of independence. A major reform focus being pushed in the Main Civil Service Department and the National Academy of Public Administration is now focused on establishing new training efforts. Thus, a reformed public management

approach may be in the offing. This approach requires as a first step training in (a) methods to prevent and fight corruption and (b) policy analysis in support of public deliberation. This cultural context provides a unique window into the impacts of structural arrangement on institutional reform efforts (Tönnesson and Paabus, 2004).

Civil service reform efforts have two primary entry points. The first is through the structure and organization of the public hierarchy itself, with training expectations and cultural influences filtering through the bureaucracy until it reaches the employees. The second is through training organizations themselves, including both centralized, government-affiliated training centers and private, decentralized providers of civil service training. Both internal organizational structure and external training structure should be addressed. Likewise, funding sources and structures may be a key component to the ultimate success of availability of reform training for civil servants.

While outcomes of the Ukrainian training efforts are not yet observable, the two models of reform training simultaneously operating within the same cultural context provides telling information about each structure's potential for achieving the aims of civil service reform. The single cultural context allows comparison of government structure while arguably holding funding and training sources constant. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the points of access to the Ukrainian civil service, and whether (and to what extent) training in democratic values and institutions is available to civil servants in each government model.

The contribution of this analysis is threefold: First, it provides empirical data describing the correlation the two distinct civil service training approaches on specific objectives to specific democratization efforts; second, it provides a framework for understanding the relationship between civil service training and democratic reform; third, it exemplifies an internally comparative approach for analyzing the impact of institutional arrangements within a single sociopolitical context, overcoming many of the quandaries of typical comparative research.

### **Theory**

Democratizing nations face concerted, explicit pressures from international forces to achieve reform in such a way that the resulting institutions of government will resemble those of other democratic nations. Primarily mimetic pressures thus focus primarily on decentralization of government and devolution of services and authority, and secondarily on democratizing institutional skill and value sets. Some authors similarly suggest that reform in post-centralized nations may naturally follow a variety of patterns ultimately resulting in different functional government systems (Goetz, 2001; Newland, 1996).

We suggest that a contingency approach may provide a useful corrective to one-best-way structural approach. As researchers have found, organizational structures and processes are shaped by numerous contingencies of environment, size, and strategic choice (Rainey, 1997, 289). As a result, organization design choices and resultant management strategies need to be informed by the factors existing in the organizations environments (Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1989). We posit a contingency approach suggesting that the presence and location of democratic reform leadership capacity at central or local government levels may significantly influence the effective sequencing of decentralization and democratization.

The implementation of democratic reform efforts in post-Soviet nations reveals two strong assumptions: first, that the European model of democracy is the appropriate governmental form; and second, that the order in which decentralization and democratization occur is either immaterial or should follow a structural-institutional pattern. European Union accession criteria largely emphasize a structural-institutional imperative. We posit an alternative theory: Not only does the order in which governments proceed to democratize matter, such sequencing may actually be vital to the potential for governments to achieve real, values-based reform at all.

We focus on two reform efforts that we expect to have different resulting structural and institutional arrangements. The first is the prevalent structural-institutional reform model, in which the initial focus is on structural change, and secondary focus is on institutional reform. The alternate model is a model of institutional-structural reform in which democratic skills and values are the initial and primary focus of reform, and structural changes are implemented after institutional arrangements reflect some critical level of successful reform (Rice, 1992; Polidano, 2001).

We find support for the institutional-structural model of reform in the theory of institutional culture. Strong culture organizations—and most highly centralized regimes certainly qualify as strong culture organizations (Newland, 1996)—engender loyalty to the centralized structure to which members of the culture belong. Altering structural institutions does not immediately affect these allegiances. If decentralization occurs before a cultural shift, subsequent changes in values and attitudes occur in relative isolation if at all. The result is fragmented reform—relatively isolated units exhibiting significantly different levels of democratic value shifts—yielding not only a fragmented culture, but also organizational culture barriers which decrease unit capacity to work in concert, threatening not only national unity but national stability as well.

Furthermore, presence of decentralized structures but absence of democratic responsiveness and transparency may yield citizen discontent and disillusionment with the promises and rhetoric for

democratic reform. The tide of public opinion may shift, and the newly democratic nation may call for a recentralization of government structure.

We suggest that an alternative to what could develop into a fragmented reform scenario is to recognize the contingent nature of democratization reform, and plan the sequencing of bureaucratic reform initiatives, taking into consideration the existing regime-structural interface of the particular country. If the regime influencing the central government is pushing democratic reforms and many regional and local governmental elites are either ignoring or opposing them, efforts directed toward democratizing the bureaucracy may be aided by capitalizing on the central structure of democratizing nations, utilizing strong culture and hierarchical allegiance to infuse democratic values of transparency, equity and responsiveness throughout the entire government apparatus before counting on autonomy of individual self-governing units to deliver on democratization. The OECD suggests that successful reform takes “advantage of some of the accustomed patterns of authority and decision-making” already present in governmental systems (OECD, 1997, 20). Such an institutional-structural approach may provide newly decentralized units with the cultural and skill-based capacity necessary to handle the unique demands of democratic governance, and provide self-governing units with an underlying cultural homogeneity not present in the structural-institutional model.

### **Research design**

The current structure of the Ukrainian civil service provides a unique opportunity to observe a decentralized civil service structure and a centralized civil service structure within the same cultural context. The Ukrainian constitution passed in 1996 promised devolution of power and a future of local self-government, with an eye to the standards of the European Union. Though the Ukrainian central government retains primary control over the flow of all government resources, the 1997 Law on Local Self-Government established such autonomy to local cities, towns and villages that local governments are now the primary providers of public goods and services, and “serve as the primary interface between the state and the citizenry” (Wise et al., 2007, 29). The central government of Ukraine, however, still maintains public employees at the local level in addition to regional and national civil servants. Though locally stationed and “de-concentrated” administrative units (Verheijen, 1998), these employees of the Ukrainian national government maintain ties to the central government in an explicitly hierarchical arrangement.

The observational units in this study are offices, agencies or departments of the Ukrainian civil service as represented by department, agency or office heads in response to a survey about Ukrainian

training practices. Of the 260 survey respondents in our sample,<sup>1</sup> 100 are officials of local self-government and 160 are central government officials operating in local offices throughout Ukraine.

Locally stationed employees of the central government and employees of local self-governments share a surprising array of common characteristics that make comparisons between them particularly vivid. The most important of these characteristics, for the purpose of our analysis, is the similar access to and expectation of training by the public administration education and training (PA ET) system for Ukrainian public employees. Wise, et al. describe the similarity: “In many respects the PA ET system operates in essentially the same fashion for local self-government employees as it does for central government employees. ... There is also little difference between central government units and local self-government bodies in the degree to which they identify training needs of various categories of employees...Local self-government employees share similar training needs with central government employees” (2007, 32-34).

Statistically, the two public employee structures appear to be strikingly comparable. They function in the same geographic units, access the same training structures, share the same job classification structure, utilize central resources, and identify the same training needs. Though regional and national members of the Ukrainian civil service access the PA ET training system much more prevalently, local employees of the central government and self-government employees have relatively similar access rates, at 15.4 percent and 18.2 percent, respectively (Wise et al., 2007, 20-21).

We are interested in the effect of government structure (centralized or decentralized) on access to training in the skills and values of democratic reform. By comparing locally situated central government employees and employees of local self-governing units, we can isolate the variable of organizational structure—hereafter referred to as centralization—and ascertain its impact on two specific types of training related to democratic institutional reform: Anticorruption training and policy skills training.

### **Variables**

Our analysis explores the impact of decentralization on the likelihood that civil servants will receive training in each of two areas of civil service training necessary for democratic reform: anticorruption training and policy skill training. A third dependent variable, technical skills training, will allow us to determine the extent to which our conclusions are general to all civil service training, and to what extent they are limited specifically to training in democratic skills and values.

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<sup>1</sup> The initial pool of respondents contained 300 respondents, but removal of observations that lacked key data resulted in a final sample size of 260.

Anticorruption efforts have become the litmus test of the presence of democratic values in developing nations (Rauch and Evans, 2000). One facet of reform that has been of particular interest to scholars in developing and post-soviet nations is the eradication of corrupt and subversive patterns in public agencies.<sup>2</sup> Corruption prevents the development of democratic, responsive institutions and inhibits the ability and willingness of public servants to adhere to the first principles of equity, justice and transparency which are necessary to effective democratic government.

In 2003, the National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine instituted a monthly advanced training program on preventing corruption, a centralized effort intended to reach civil servants at all levels of Ukrainian national government. The penetration of this program into both centralized and decentralized government structures in Ukraine provides insight into the centralization/decentralization paradox in civil service reform. The anticorruption variable used in this model is a dichotomous response to the question, “Did civil servants of your Department pass the monthly advanced training program on preventing corruption, implemented by the National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in 2003?” (see table 1).<sup>3,4</sup>

Policy skill training is a dependent variable of interest in civil service reform analysis because it represents an effort to provide civil servants with the tools necessary for devolution of decision making responsibility to more decentralized units. Provision of policy skill training to local units provides some evidence of effort to prepare civil servants for democratic reform. Our policy skill variable measures a dichotomous response to the question, “What types of training programs your agency makes available to its employees?” in which a list of training types was provided and respondents were invited to “Please select all that apply” (see table 1).

Technical skill training is included in this analysis as a tool for comparison with the anticorruption and policy variables. Our assertion is that the aforementioned variables represent training unique and important to achieving democratization and civil service reform. Technical training, in contrast, is

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<sup>2</sup> Rausch and Evans (2000) discuss the virtues of centralized, hierarchical meritocratic arrangements as a means for combating patronage systems in post-Soviet governments. While this is tangential to our main point, it is certainly a supporting thesis

<sup>3</sup> The dependent variable in this model reflects survey responses about participation in a 2003 training initiative. Because the survey was completed in 2006, there may be some issues of temporal precedence. Our assumption is that the organizational characteristics reported in the 2006 survey are relatively stable (or at worst randomly variable) and thus reflect values that may be used in predicting the odds of employee participation in the 2003 anticorruption initiative. The policy skills model is free of this ambiguity of temporal precedence.

<sup>4</sup> The survey allowed three possible responses to this question, “yes,” “no,” and “I have never heard about the program.” Only 17 respondents in the sample selected the third option, 10 local government employees and 7 central government employees. For the purpose of this analysis, these 17 responses were coded as “no” responses under the assumption that the department or agency head would have been more likely to hear of the program if employees had participated.

necessary for civil servants in virtually any government structure or political environment. The technical training model, therefore, provides a control for our claims regarding “democratization training” efforts.

Note that while we understand that the factors and mechanisms affecting availability of each type of training may differ—particularly for technical training—our primary purpose is to compare and contrast the effect of a single independent variable, centralization, and we therefore utilize the same independent variables in each model.

An inherent assumption in our analysis is that training of civil servants provides an effective means of promoting and bringing about cultural and organizational change prerequisite to effective democratic reform, though we recognize that the relationship between reform-based training and reform outcomes is nuanced (McCourt and Sola, 1999; Healy, 2001). Our dependent variables are neither outputs nor outcomes—indeed, neither outputs nor outcomes are presently observable in the Ukraine’s relatively recent efforts at democratization. Rather, these dependent variables represent important inputs to the process of transforming the civil service. We therefore present the following analysis as a means of determining the pathways we believe to be most likely to provide civil servants with access to the concepts and procedures that will facilitate overall reform.

Our primary independent variable of interest is the centralization variable, which denotes whether the responding agency is a regionally located central government authority (central admin. =1) or whether it is an agency of the decentralized local self-government structure (central admin. =0).

Though descriptive analysis of the centralization variable reveals striking similarities between the central government agencies and the decentralized units (Wise et al., 2007), it is nonetheless conceivable that certain characteristics unique to one of these structures might interfere with our understanding of the relationship between centralization and propensity to receive or provide training of various types. We therefore control for a variety of organizational characteristics, organization culture variables, training goals, funding sources and training sources.

The organizational characteristics included in our model are agency size (as number of employees), percent of employees who are service employees, percent of employees who are female, percent of employees with postsecondary degrees (including associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, specialist or candidate of science degrees), percent of employees aged 46 or older, and proximity to a region containing a NAPA training center.

It is plausible that the organizational culture of regional central government agencies and agencies of self-governing units may affect their propensity to provide certain kinds of training. We therefore control for such cultural variables as whether or not an employee makes his/her own training decisions; whether

seniority, rank, need for job completion, promotion, or legal requirements impact training decisions; and whether receipt of training impacts an employee's prospects for promotion, pay, and retention. To control for overall quality of the hiring pool, we also include the respondent's perception of whether or not lack of skill is a significant problem for the agency in hiring new employees.

Organizations with different hierarchical structures may also have differing goals for training. Included in this model are seven specific training goals<sup>5</sup> including conformity to legal requirements, increasing an employee's ability to perform his/her current tasks, to prepare the employee for new tasks within the department, to prepare employees for leadership positions, to prepare employees for tasks in a new position outside the department, to improve the overall performance of the organization, or to increase employee satisfaction in performing current responsibilities and tasks.

Agencies with different hierarchical structures may have different funding sources. Funding sources, in turn, may be associated with specific types of training, and therefore provide a meaningful control in this analysis. Five funding sources are identified, including state budget, ministerial or departmental budget, agency budget, external grants (e.g. NGOs, foreign organizations), and employees themselves.<sup>6</sup>

Organizations may systematically differ in their propensity to access training from specific sources. We control for reported use of the following training providers: University schools of public administration institutes of public administration, management development institutes, Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration, foreign organizations, Ukrainian NGOs, specialized ministerial academies, regional training centers, and other training sources. It is also important to note that some organizations are more likely to provide training in skills necessary for democratization. By including the primary training sources accessed by the agencies, we also control for these effects.

The use of three dependent variables provides some advantages in our analysis. The first two dependent variables reflect training in skills related to democratic skills and values, and therefore provide separate tests of our underlying theory. Differences between these two variables, however, also provide more nuanced information about the mechanisms to which reform-based training is susceptible. The first model (anticorruption) focuses more on availability of training in democratic values whereas the second model (policy skills) focuses more on democratic skills. Moreover, the anticorruption model describes access of employees to a specific training initiative, whereas the policy skills model describes

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<sup>5</sup> Training goal questions were asked in two sets of identical questions, one for state-mandated training and one for non-mandated training, each yielding yes/no dichots. We have collapsed these responses into a single variable by summing the responses, yielding an ordinal scale from 0-2.

<sup>6</sup> Respondents were asked to 'indicate the primary sources of funding for the training which your employees receive.' The categories are thus not mutually exclusive, and all listed funding sources are therefore included in the model (no reference category).

more general use and availability of training. The third dependent variable, availability of technical skills training, provides a contrast to the reform-based skills of the first two models, and is expected to provide insight as to how much of the effect in our models is observable in all civil service training contexts, and to what extent it is unique to institutional democratization.

### **Hypotheses**

Based on the theory and models described above, we intend to test three specific hypotheses describing relationships between centralization and the dependent variable in each of the three models.

1. Anticorruption hypothesis: We expect a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between centralization and anticorruption training. Specifically, we expect central government agencies to be more likely to report having employees who completed the 2003 anticorruption training sponsored by the National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
2. Policy skills hypothesis: We expect a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between centralization and policy skills training. Specifically, we expect central government agencies to be more likely to report making policy skills training available to employees.
3. Technical skills hypothesis: We do *not* expect to reject the null hypothesis that there will be no significant relationship between centralization and the availability of technical skills training.

### **Data and methods**

From July to December of 2006, Indiana University conducted an intensive assessment of public administration education and training (PA ET) in Ukraine for the Eurasia Foundation (Wise, et al. 2007). Data used in this paper is derived primarily from the Public Administration Education and Training Needs Assessment Survey administered to government officials in Ukraine as part of the PA ET effort. This survey evaluates current Ukrainian civil service training practices and identifies areas of training need. The survey was conducted in two waves, one surveying key administrative institutions in all 24 Ukrainian oblasts as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the second surveying local self-government governments in all the oblast center cities throughout the country. The response rate for the oblast survey was 80 percent, while the response rate the local self-government survey was 56 percent.<sup>7</sup>

Logistic analysis of each binary dependent variable is completed using logit models based on the default settings in the Stata 9 statistical package. Analysis was aided by use of the supplemental Stata Spost command package (Long and Freese, 2005).

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<sup>7</sup> More information about the survey can be found in the appendices of the report by Wise, et al. (2007), which provides detail on survey administration, including follow-up steps with initial non-respondents and a copy of the survey questionnaire.

## Results

As hypothesized, government structure has a strong effect on the probability of receiving democratic reform training. If an agency is in the central government structure, the odds that members of the agency will have received anticorruption training are 7.5 times greater (an increase in the odds of about 648 percent) than if the employee is in a local government structure ( $z=4.178$ ;  $P<0.001$  for a two-tailed test). Similarly, if an agency has a centralized government structure, the odds that the agency makes policy skills training available to its employees are roughly 3 times greater (an increase in the odds of about 187 percent;  $z=2.559$ ;  $P<0.01$  for a two-tailed test).

Also as hypothesized, there appears to be no significant relationship between centralization and technical skills training. Our model suggests that the odds of agency technical training provision are 1.3 times greater<sup>8</sup> if the agency is *decentralized*, though this finding fails to achieve statistical significance ( $z=0.657$ ;  $P=0.511$  for a two-tailed test).

These findings hold in spite of controls for size and composition of organization, patterns of decision making regarding employee training, and other cultural factors affecting the use and value of different kinds of training within the organization.

It is particularly interesting to note the differences in the impact of the control variables on the predicted probability of each type of training. A side-by-side comparison of these models (see table 2) provides some initial insight regarding the ways in which different internal mechanisms operate on the availability of different kinds of training to government employees.

In addition to centralized structure, agency size, gender composition, employee empowerment to make training decisions, compliance with legal requirements, use of training in making promotion decisions, some goal variables and use of specific training organizations (particularly Ukrainian NGOs) have statistically significant roles in predicting anticorruption training (at the  $P<0.05$  level for two-tailed tests). Some of these variables have greater impact than others; for example, for every standard deviation increase in agency size, (an increase of roughly 100 employees), the odds of anticorruption training are 3.4 times greater ( $z=4.115$ ;  $P<0.001$  for a two-tailed test). For every standard deviation increase in the reported percentage of female employees (approximately 18.5 percentage points), the odds of anticorruption training are 1.5 times greater ( $z=-2.040$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test).

A culture of employee empowerment appears to significantly improve the odds of anticorruption training within a department or agency. If individual employees within an agency are responsible for

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<sup>8</sup> For ease of interpretation, this result is reported in terms of *decentralization*. As shown in table 2, the factor change coefficient for centralization is 0.777 ( $z=-0.657$ ;  $P=0.511$  for a two-tailed test).

making their own training decisions, the odds of that agency having employees who received anticorruption training are roughly 30 times greater ( $z=2.886$ ;  $P<0.004$  for a two-tailed test). Of the five funding source variables included, only employee self-funding had a positive impact on the odds of anticorruption training within the agency; though this result failed to achieve statistical significance, the model suggests that the odds of anticorruption training within an agency are about 1.4 times greater if employees are a primary source of funding for their own training ( $z=0.587$ ;  $P=0.557$  for a two-tailed test). Conversely, if an agency uses its own budget as a primary source of funding, the odds of anticorruption training decrease by a factor of 0.39, a decrease in the odds of roughly 61 percent ( $z=-2.206$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test).

If an agency accesses training provided by Ukrainian NGOs, the odds of any employees receiving anticorruption training are about 5.5 times greater (an increase of about 449 percent) than if the agency did not use Ukrainian NGOs ( $z=2.070$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test). Of the nine sources of training included, all but two—university schools of public administration and regional training centers—appear to have positive relationships with anticorruption training, though none but Ukrainian NGOs achieve a significant (positive or negative) correlation with anticorruption training at the 0.05 level.

The impact of legal requirements on anticorruption training appears to be both important and somewhat complicated. While having conformity to legal requirements as a goal of training within an agency has a significant, positive correlation with anticorruption training, making the odds of anticorruption training to be 2.5 times greater (an increase in the odds of about 154 percent;  $z=2.290$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test), use of legal requirements to select employees to receive training has the inverse effect, decreasing the odds of anticorruption training by a factor of 0.41, or a decrease of roughly 59 percent ( $z=-2.261$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test).<sup>9</sup>

The model predicting the likelihood of receiving policy skills training illuminates real differences in the mechanisms affecting receipt of this kind of training as compared with receipt of anticorruption training or training in technical skills. While centralization is a strong predictor of policy skills training as it was for anticorruption training, the culture and procedures predicting this type of training are distinct from the patterns observed in the anticorruption model.

In particular, there appear to be distinctly different patterns in the effects of training source and funding than for the anticorruption model. If an agency receives training from a foreign organization, the odds of the agency providing policy skills training are about 5 times greater (an increase in the odds of

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<sup>9</sup> These relationships remain quite stable even when one or the other of these variables is excluded from the model; each variable appears to contribute to the overall explanatory power of the model independently, and omission of either variable does not change the direction of the relationship of the remaining variable with the dependent variable.

about 405 percent;  $z=2.637$ ;  $P<0.01$  for a two-tailed test). Training by a specialized ministerial academy increases the odds of policy skill training by about 2.3 times (about 125 percent;  $z=1.649$ ;  $P<0.1$  for a two-tailed test). In contrast, if an agency receives training from a Ukrainian NGO, the odds of receiving policy skills training decrease by a factor of 0.25 (a decrease in the odds of about 74 percent;  $z=-1.649$ ;  $P<0.1$  for a two-tailed test). The only statistically significant funding relationship in the model is a negative relationship between ministerial/department funding and policy skills training, wherein ministerial or department funding decreases the odds of receiving policy skills training by a factor of 0.24 (a decrease in the odds of about 76 percent;  $z=-3.26$ ;  $P\leq 0.001$  for a two-tailed test).

As expected, significant contrasts exist between the models predicting democratic skills training (anticorruption, policy skills) and the model predicting training in technical skills. As predicted, there is no statistical difference in technical training provision between centralized and decentralized government structures. Interestingly, it appears from the model that even if there were a relationship between centralization and technical skills training, that relationship would likely be an inverse relationship—in direct contrast to the models discussed above. That said, it is also apparent from the technical skills model that patterns of funding and training source differ from patterns of training source and funding in the democratic skills models.

External grants appear to have a significant impact on the odds of technical training provision within government agencies, as do some other forms of training funding.<sup>10</sup> If an agency uses external grants as a primary source of funding, the odds of receiving technical skill training are 6.3 times greater (an increase in the odds of about 534 percent;  $z=3.518$ ;  $P<0.001$  for a two-tailed test). If an agency reports that employees provide self-payment for training, the odds of receiving technical training are 3.2 times greater (an increase in the odds of 219 percent;  $z=2.525$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test). If ministerial/departmental budgets are used as a primary source of training funding, the odds of making technical training available are 2 times greater (an increase in the odds of roughly 100 percent;  $z=1.715$ ;  $P<0.05$  for a two-tailed test). In apparent corroboration with the inverse relationship between centralization and provision of technical training, state funding is the only funding source with an even marginally statistically significant inverse relationship to provision of technical training. If an agency reports the state budget as a primary source of training funding, the odds of technical training provision decreases by a factor of 0.5 (a decrease in the odds of about 50 percent;  $z=-1.761$ ;  $P<0.1$  for a two-tailed test).

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<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that agencies were asked to indicate their primary sources [sic] of funding; therefore these categories are not mutually exclusive.

Figures 1-3 provide visual representation of the predicted probabilities for the anticorruption model, policy skills model and technical skills model, respectively. Except for centralization, all variables are held constant at their mean (in the case of the continuous variables) or their median values<sup>11</sup>. These predicted probabilities are graphed along the x-axis over a continuous variable, organization size. The y-axis represents the predicted probability of receiving the type of training indicated by the dependent variable in each model. Because there is significant correlation between the continuous variable (number of employees) and the dependent variable (anticorruption training) in the first model, graph 1 takes the form of a standard s-curve. Because no such correlation exists between size and the dependent variables in the two subsequent models, these predicted probability graphs appear much more linear. The main point to be observed from the predicted probability graphs is that organizations have a significantly higher probability of receiving democratic skills training in both of the first models if the agency is located within a centralized government structure. A comparison with the third graph reveals that such is not the case for technical training.

While the factor change analysis presented above is a useful tool for exploring the impact of centralization on the odds of receiving democratic reform training, these impacts are of little use if the odds of receiving such training are extremely low. Predicted probability analysis allows a more concrete prediction of the impact of centralization and other factors on the likelihood of democratic reform training. Table 3 describes the predicted probability of training availability for both the anticorruption and policy skills models. The values in the table represent the predicted probability of training availability for each model, holding all other variables constant at specific values. For example, the value in the top left cell of the table indicates that if a centralized agency reports using university schools of public administration as a training source, the predicted probability of agency employees having attended anticorruption training is 0.23, holding all other training sources constant at zero and all other variables held at the values specified in table 4. In general, all continuous variables are held constant at their mean values and all other variables are held constant at median values.<sup>12</sup>

The predicted probability analysis presented in table 3 paints a vivid picture of the overall impact of centralization on the likelihood of access to reform-based training. Without exception, the predicted probability of receiving anticorruption or policy skills training is higher in centralized agencies than it is in decentralized units. This is true even when varying training source, funding source, and employee

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<sup>11</sup> The variable for distance from a regional training center is considered a non-continuous variable because it is a zero-truncated value, and is held constant at its median value, 125.

<sup>12</sup> Non-continuous values have non-interpretable means and thus the median value is a more appropriate realization of the "average" agency or department.

empowerment variables. In most cases, centralization increases the predicted probability of reform-based training by roughly 20 percentage points.

### **Discussion**

The results presented here suggest several important points about the process of the role of civil service training in reform and democratization. First, as hypothesized, a centralized civil service structure is more conducive to civil servant access to reform-based training. This is most strongly evidenced by the values-based (anticorruption) training model, but also holds for more skills-based training such as incorporating citizen input and learning policy skills.

A second point suggests that capacity training—training in technical skills necessary to complete the routine tasks of a government job—appears to be a fundamentally different type of training from the training specifically designed to be conducive to democratic reform. Previous research in civil service training should therefore be judiciously applied, as the mechanisms of capacity training appear to differ significantly from the mechanisms of reform-type training. Indeed, it appears possible that use of traditional capacity training models may actually be counterproductive to the process of imparting democratic values and skills.

According to the OECD, “One common objective of public service training is to support the implementation of administrative reform and modernization; another is to improve professional skills and qualifications of staff to increase efficiency of the public service,” (OECD, 1997, 4). Our research suggests that not only are these two goals of training distinctly unique, but they may require diametrically opposed methods of implementation.

We suggest that more study is needed to observe the outcomes of various training methods and models, with particular attention to the issue of premature decentralization and its effect on democratic reform. We propose that shifting strong centralized cultures toward more democratic skills and values may be best accomplished by capitalizing on the strong allegiances within such culture to more effectively diffuse democratic values prior to decentralization.

We also call for more study of the differing mechanisms of capacity training and reform training—little is known about the ways in which these types of training may be fundamentally different. Current best practices in civil service reform are ignorant of these differences, to the end that current efforts at support of democratic reform may actually be counterproductive.

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**Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables included in logit models (n=260)**

Variable	Description	Type	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Dependent Variables</b>						
Anticorruption training	<i>Did civil servants of your Department pass the monthly advanced training program on preventing corruption, implemented by the National Academy of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in 2003?</i> 1=Yes 0=No	Binary	0.377	0.486	0	1
Policy skills training	<i>What types of training programs your agency makes available to its employees?</i> 1=Policy skills 0=Not policy skills	Binary	0.388	0.488	0	1
Technical skills training	<i>What types of training programs your agency makes available to its employees?</i> 1=Technical skills 0=Not technical skills	Binary	0.565	0.497	0	1
<b>Centralization</b>						
Central admin.	0=Municipal authority 1=Regional central administration	Binary	0.615	0.487	0	1
<b>Org Characteristics</b>						
Agency size	Number of employees in the department	Continuous	62.577	106.384	3	922
Pct. service	Estimated percentage of service employees	Continuous	3.999	10.892	0	85
Pct. female	Estimated percentage of total number of employees who are female	Continuous	60.704	18.534	0	100
Pct. postsecondary	Estimated percentage of the total number of employees that have attained any of the following educational levels: associate degree, bachelor degree, specialist degree, master's degree, candidate of science.	Continuous	95.085	8.079	60	100
Pct 46 or older	Estimated percentage of the total number of employees in department who are 46 years of age or older.	Continuous	37.600	20.030	0	100
Proximity to train ctr.	Proximity to NAPA training center 0=regional training center is located in region; otherwise, value=distance to nearest training center	Zero-truncated	123.185	80.281	0	256
<b>Cultural Variables</b>						
Employee decision	<i>Who in your unit/division decides who should be trained?</i> 1=Employees themselves 0=Not employees themselves	Binary	0.038	0.193	0	1
Seniority considered	<i>Which of the following criteria does your department uses to make decisions about which of your employees should receive training?</i> 1=Seniority of employee	Binary	0.200	0.401	0	1
Rank considered	1=Rank of employee	Binary	0.112	0.315	0	1
Job need considered	1=Employee needs training to perform job duties	Binary	0.919	0.273	0	1
Promotion considered	1=Employee requires training for promotion	Binary	0.462	0.499	0	1
Legal requirements	1=Legal requirements mandated in new or amended legislation	Binary	0.635	0.482	0	1
Impacts promotion	1=Training completion is taken into account for promotion to a higher position in my organization	Binary	0.788	0.409	0	1
Impacts pay	<i>How does training completion impact an employee in your organization?</i> 1=Training completion is taken into consideration in deciding the amount of pay increase an employee will receive in my organization	Binary	0.038	0.193	0	1
Required for retention	1=Training completion is required for an employee to retain his/her job in my organization	Binary	0.096	0.295	0	1
Candidates lack skill	<i>Please indicate if your department faces any of the following problems when hiring new employees. 1= Many job candidates lack the requisite skills to perform assigned tasks</i>	Binary	0.477	0.500	0	1
<b>Goals of training</b>						
Legal requirements	<i>If your department does make short- or long-term training available, from the perspective of the department, what are the goals of training?</i> To conform to existing or new legal and/or procedural requirements 0=this is not a goal of training; 1=this is a goal for either state mandated or non-mandated training; 2=this is a goal for all training (this coding scheme applies to all goal variables below)	Ordinal	1.335	0.745	0	2
Current task perform.	To conform to existing or new legal and/or procedural requirements	Ordinal	1.354	0.701	0	2
New tasks in dept.	To increase the ability of the employee to perform their current responsibilities and tasks	Ordinal	1.192	0.811	0	2
Prep. for leadership	To prepare the employee for new responsibilities and tasks within the department	Ordinal	0.788	0.837	0	2
New tasks out of dept	To prepare the employee for a leadership role within the department	Ordinal	0.238	0.567	0	2
Improve org perform.	To prepare the employee for new responsibilities and tasks in a new position outside of the department	Ordinal	1.400	0.726	0	2
Employee satisfaction	To improve the overall performance of the organization	Ordinal	0.665	0.810	0	2
<b>Source of funding</b>						
<i>Please indicate the primary source of funding for the training which your employees receive?</i>						
State budget	1=State budget	Binary	0.615	0.487	0	1
Ministerial/dept.	1=Ministerial or departmental budget	Binary	0.250	0.434	0	1
Mgmt. dev. institutes	1=Agency budget	Binary	0.392	0.489	0	1
Employees	1=Employees pay themselves	Binary	0.177	0.382	0	1
External grants	1=External grants (e.g. NGOs, foreign organizations)	Binary	0.188	0.392	0	1
<b>Source of training</b>						
<i>Which of the following organizations does your department utilize to make training available to employees? Please select all that apply.</i>						
University PA schools	1=University schools of public administration	Binary	0.400	0.491	0	1
Institutes of PA	1=Institutes of public administration	Binary	0.373	0.485	0	1
Mgmt. dev. institutes	1=Management development institutes	Binary	0.465	0.500	0	1
Ukrainian Acad. PA	1=Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration	Binary	0.638	0.481	0	1
Foreign organizations	1=Foreign Organizations	Binary	0.142	0.350	0	1
Ukrainian NGOs	1=Ukrainian NGOs	Binary	0.069	0.254	0	1
Ministerial academy	1=Specialized ministerial academy	Binary	0.165	0.372	0	1
Regional training ctr.	1=Regional training centers	Binary	0.692	0.462	0	1
Other source	1=Other source	Binary	0.150	0.358	0	1

**Table 2: Logistic regression standard and factor change coefficients for technical, policy and anticorruption training dependent variables (n=260)**

	Technical training				Policy training				Anticorruption training		
	$\beta$	$e^{\beta}$	$z$		$\beta$	$e^{\beta}$	$z$		$\beta$	$e^{\beta}$	$z$
<b>Centralization</b>											
Central admin.	2.0124	7.48	4.18	****	1.0502	2.86	2.55	**	-0.2493	0.78	-0.66
<b>Org characteristics</b>											
Agency size	0.0115	1.01	4.12	****	0.0009	1.00	0.51		-0.0009	1.00	-0.56
Pct. service	-0.0165	0.98	-0.98		-0.0101	0.99	-0.66		0.0212	1.02	1.11
Pct. female	-0.0226	0.98	-2.04	**	0.0086	1.01	0.94		-0.0143	0.99	-1.56
Pct. postsecondary	-0.0018	1.00	-0.07		0.0039	1.00	0.17		-0.0262	0.97	-1.19
Pct. 46 or older	-0.0095	0.99	-1.00		-0.0074	0.99	-0.90		0.0117	1.01	1.44
Proximity to train ctr.	-0.0022	1.00	-0.83		-0.0027	1.00	-1.12		0.0068	1.01	2.98
<b>Cultural variables</b>											
Employee decision	3.4110	30.30	2.89	***	0.9777	2.66	1.20		-0.2874	0.75	-0.34
Seniority considered	0.3045	1.36	0.55		-0.6950	0.50	-1.41		0.5023	1.65	1.08
Rank considered	-0.8249	0.44	-1.09		-0.2661	0.77	-0.40		-1.3739	0.25	-2.20
Job need considered	-0.6323	0.53	-0.96		0.7525	2.12	1.16		-0.2789	0.76	-0.47
Promotion considered	-0.4614	0.63	-1.21		0.2580	1.29	0.73		0.3395	1.40	1.00
Legal requirements	-0.8870	0.41	-2.26	**	0.1472	1.16	0.42		-0.6718	0.51	-1.98
Impacts promotion	1.0059	2.73	1.90	*	-0.3425	0.71	-0.80		0.0666	1.07	0.16
Impacts pay	0.7180	2.05	0.80		1.4270	4.17	1.64	*	0.8120	2.25	0.91
Required for retention	-0.0631	0.94	-0.10		-1.6178	0.20	-2.45	**	1.1368	3.12	1.80
Candidates lack skill	-0.4827	0.62	-1.32		-0.1444	0.87	-0.44		0.4636	1.59	1.44
<b>Goals of training</b>											
Legal requirements	-0.4445	0.64	-1.44		-0.3545	0.70	-1.35		-0.0070	0.99	-0.03
Current task perform.	0.9324	2.54	2.29		0.3741	1.45	1.13		0.2672	1.31	0.87
New tasks in dept.	0.3731	1.45	1.20		-0.0871	0.92	-0.31		-0.4177	0.66	-1.50
Prep. for leadership	-0.8471	0.43	-2.88	***	0.2604	1.30	1.05		0.0153	1.02	0.06
New tasks out of dept	0.4614	1.59	1.30		0.8923	2.44	2.52	**	-0.0419	0.96	-0.12
Improve org perform.	-0.2510	0.78	-0.69		0.1618	1.18	0.54		-0.0684	0.93	-0.25
Employee satisfaction	0.2859	1.33	1.15		-0.1686	0.84	-0.74		0.0686	1.07	0.30
<b>Source of funding</b>											
State budget	-0.6746	0.51	-1.40		-0.3577	0.70	-0.88		-0.6960	0.50	-1.78
Ministerial/dept.	-0.6899	0.50	-1.47		-1.4425	0.24	-3.26	****	0.6952	2.00	1.70
Mgmt. dev. institutes	-0.9401	0.39	-2.21		0.2339	1.26	0.63		-0.2461	0.78	-0.70
Employees	0.3136	1.37	0.59		-0.7527	0.47	-1.58		1.1630	3.20	2.52
External grants	-0.5621	0.57	-0.95		0.3648	1.44	0.70		1.8379	6.28	3.51
<b>Source of training</b>											
University PA schools	-0.1641	0.85	-0.38		-0.4127	0.66	-1.04		0.2744	1.32	0.72
Institutes of PA	0.6178	1.85	1.41		-0.0080	0.99	-0.02		-0.3210	0.73	-0.80
Mgmt. dev. institutes	0.4461	1.56	1.08		0.2938	1.34	0.79		0.8570	2.36	2.19
Ukrainian Acad. PA	0.0052	1.01	0.01		0.4611	1.59	1.23		1.0035	2.73	2.64
Foreign organizations	0.4047	1.50	0.67		1.6224	5.07	2.64	***	-0.0311	0.97	-0.05
Ukrainian NGOs	1.7037	5.49	2.07	**	-1.3541	0.26	-1.65	*	-1.5886	0.20	-2.16
Ministerial academy	0.1161	1.12	0.24		0.8112	2.25	1.65	*	-0.0867	0.92	-0.19
Regional training ctr.	-0.2210	0.80	-0.49		0.3650	1.44	0.91		0.1882	1.21	0.50
Other source	0.1367	1.15	0.24		0.2305	1.26	0.47		-0.1669	0.85	-0.35
<b>Constant</b>	0.3493		0.13		-2.5811		-1.00		1.7570		0.72
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.326				0.227				0.212		

Note: \* $P \leq 0.1$ ; \*\* $P \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $P \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*\* $P \leq 0.001$

**Table 3: Predicted probability of employees in department having received anticorruption training and predicted probability of making policy skills training available to employees<sup>13</sup> (n=260).**

	Anticorruption training		Policy skills training	
	Centralized	Decentralized	Centralized	Decentralized
<b>Training sources</b>				
University schools of public administration only	0.23	0.04	0.25	0.10
Institutes of public administration only	0.39	0.08	0.33	0.15
Management development institutes only	0.35	0.07	0.40	0.19
Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration only	0.26	0.04	0.44	0.22
Foreign Organizations only	0.34	0.07	0.72	0.47
Ukrainian NGOs only	0.66	0.20	0.11	0.04
Specialized ministerial academy only	0.28	0.05	0.53	0.28
Regional training centers only	0.22	0.04	0.42	0.20
Other training source only	0.29	0.05	0.39	0.18
<b>Funding sources</b>				
State budget only	0.22	0.04	0.53	0.28
Ministerial/department budget only	0.22	0.04	0.28	0.12
Agency funding only	0.18	0.03	0.67	0.42
Employee self funding only	0.43	0.92	0.43	0.21
External funding (e.g. NGOs, foreign orgs) only	0.24	0.04	0.70	0.45
<b>Employee empowerment</b>				
Employee decision	0.89	0.53	0.75	0.51
No employee decision	0.22	0.04	0.53	0.28

Predicted probabilities vary on listed variables only; for funding and training source predicted probabilities, ideal types include only one source at a time; all other comparable sources are held constant at 0. For training source analysis, funding sources are held constant at median values; for funding source analysis, training sources are held constant at median values. Unless otherwise noted, all continuous variables are held at mean values and all remaining variables are held at median values; see table 4.

<sup>13</sup> Based on logit models presented in table 2.

**Table 4: Mean and median values assigned in predicted probability analysis unless otherwise noted (n=260)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variable type</b>	<b>Value type</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b><i>Org Characteristics</i></b>			
Agency size	Continuous	Mean	62.577
Pct. service	Continuous	Mean	3.999
Pct. female	Continuous	Mean	60.704
Pct. postsecondary	Continuous	Mean	95.085
Pct 46 or older	Continuous	Mean	37.600
Proximity to train ctr.	Zero-truncated	Median	125
<b><i>Cultural Variables</i></b>			
Employee decision	Binary	Median	0
Seniority considered	Binary	Median	0
Rank considered	Binary	Median	0
Job need considered	Binary	Median	1
Promotion considered	Binary	Median	0
Legal requirements	Binary	Median	1
Impacts promotion	Binary	Median	1
Impacts pay	Binary	Median	0
Required for retention	Binary	Median	0
Candidates lack skill	Binary	Median	0
<b><i>Goals of training</i></b>			
Legal requirements	Ordinal	Median	1.5
Current task perform.	Ordinal	Median	1
New tasks in dept.	Ordinal	Median	1
Prep. for leadership	Ordinal	Median	1
New tasks out of dept	Ordinal	Median	0
Improve org perform.	Ordinal	Median	2
Employee satisfaction	Ordinal	Median	0
<b><i>Source of funding</i></b>			
State budget	Binary	Median	1
Ministerial/dept.	Binary	Median	0
Mgmt. dev. institutes	Binary	Median	0
Employees	Binary	Median	0
External grants	Binary	Median	0
<b><i>Source of training</i></b>			
University PA schools	Binary	Median	0
Institutes of PA	Binary	Median	0
Mgmt. dev. institutes	Binary	Median	0
Ukrainian Acad. PA	Binary	Median	1
Foreign organizations	Binary	Median	0
Ukrainian NGOs	Binary	Median	0
Ministerial academy	Binary	Median	0
Regional training ctr.	Binary	Median	1
Other source	Binary	Median	0

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Anticorruption Training




Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Policy Skills Training




Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Technical Training

